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Abstract
Our world is a dynamic one: many kinds of objects and events
change markedly over time. Despite this, most theories about
concepts and categories are either insensitive to time-based
variation, or treat people’s sensitivity to change as a result of
process-level characteristics (like memory limits, captured by
weighting more recent items more highly) that produce irra-
tional order effects during learning. In this paper we use two
experiments and nine computational models to explore how
people learn in a changing environment. We find, first, that
people adapt to change during a category learning task; and,
second, that this adaptation stems not only from weighting
more recent items more highly, but also from forming sensi-
ble anticipations about the nature of the change.
Keywords: categorization, change detection, concepts, dy-
namics, time dependence, order effects
At no two moments in time are we presented with the same
world. Objects move, plants and animals are born and die,
friends come and go, the sun rises and sets, and so on. More
abstractly, while some of the rules that describe our world –
like physical laws – are invariant over the course of our ev-
eryday experience, others – like legal rules – are not. Given
some appropriate time scale, certain characteristics of an en-
tity or class of entities can change; moreover, they may tend
to change in systematic ways. Temperature varies cyclically
as a function of time of day and time of year; with a grad-
ual rise over the last century. As another example, the fea-
tures that describe phones have changed considerably over
recent decades: not only do modern phones perform many
new functions, they are also physically smaller, sleeker, and
smoother. People are aware of this temporal structure and
adapt their predictions to it: if asked to predict the tempera-
ture six months from today, people will give quite different
answers than if asked to predict the temperature tomorrow.
We do not modify predictions in an ad hoc or senseless fash-
ion; instead, we appear to be attuned to particular details of
the nature of the dynamic variation in category structure.
One consequence of recognizing the changeable nature of
categories is that the time at which observations are made
matters. A machine with a rotary dial could very well be a
typical phone if it were observed in 1980, but this is much less
plausible if the observation dates from 2010. These changes
over time introduce strong order effects into the classifica-
tion problem. Order effects in categorization are well-studied,
but people’s sensitivity to order is generally thought to result
from weighting more recent items more highly (generally as a
result of poor memory) or inefficient learning rules (e.g., Kr-
uschke, 2006; Sakamoto, Jones, & Love, 2008). Irrespective
of whether these process limitations arise from the use of ad
hoc (Anderson, 1990) or rationally motivated (Sanborn, Grif-
fiths, & Navarro, 2010) computation strategies, the shared as-
sumption is that people should not be sensitive to order infor-
mation when learning new categories. While this is certainly
true in some cases, in other situations order sensitivity might
actually be a sensible adaptation. Especially when a cate-
gory is changing in systematic ways (e.g., phones are getting
steadily more complex), a sensible learner should be able to
extrapolate about the future in a way that is sensitive to that
systematicity. The central question of this paper is whether
people can perform this extrapolation, and whether it can be
separated from an order sensitivity that arises from simply
weighting more recent items more highly.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The first half
explores the advantages of being sensitive to order in cate-
gory learning. This is important because the literature tends
to focus on the negative consequences of order sensitivity –
namely, irrational order effects when the environment is in
fact stationary. However, we present computational modeling
highlighting the fact that when the world is actually changing,
being sensitive to that change constitutes an enormous advan-
tage. In the second part of the paper, we investigate the nature
of human order sensitivity. To what extent does it reflect im-
perfect memory, and to what extent does it reflect sensible
adaptation and extrapolation about systematic change? Ex-
perimental and computational results1 demonstrate that both
factors play an important role.
The importance of order sensitivity
We begin our exploration into the importance of order sensi-
tivity with a prototype model for categorization, which in its
standard form is not sensitive to order. In this model, people
are assumed to construct a single representation of the proto-
type, or the central tendency of the category. In its most usual
form, if the learner has seen a series of t items, then the pro-
totype µt is found by taking the arithmetic mean of the mental








where xi denotes the mental representation (e.g., co-ordinates
in psychological space) of the i-th category member. If the
1Because the paper involves a large number of models (9 in to-
tal), we outline the structure of the models only in general terms
here: precise specifications are available in the supplementary ma-
terials found at www.compcogscilab.com/dan/.
809
distribution of the category members is normal, then the
learner is assumed to keep track the standard deviation of the
t category members around the prototype σt . The probability
that a new item belongs to the category is proportional to the
probability that the category distribution assigns to that item.
As noted by several authors (e.g. Ashby & Alfonso-Reese,
1995) this model has an interpretation as a rational model
when the category members satisfy certain assumptions – in-
cluding the assumption that the world does not change.
It is precisely because the world is assumed not to change
that all category members are assigned equal weight in Equa-
tion 1, regardless of when they were observed. As a conse-
quence, the model predictions on trial t do not depend on the
order in which the preceding items were observed. This or-
der invariance is characteristic of most probabilistic models
for category learning, whether they be prototype, exemplar,
or cluster-based (see Griffiths, Sanborn, Canini, & Navarro,
2008). As noted by a number of authors (e.g. Sakamoto et al.,
2008; Navarro & Perfors, 2009) such models perform poorly
as models of human performance when the data presented to
people contains strong order effects. To address this, it is
commonplace to consider an updating rule that is more sen-
sitive to the changing structure of the data. The general idea
is to assume that when the learner encounters a new category
member, he or she moves the prototype a little closer to the
new category member. This has the effect of weighting new
items more than older items. The simplest version of this rule
is as follows: if xt refers to the feature value(s) for the new
item, then the new prototype location at time t+1 is
µt = φµt−1 +(1−φ)xt . (2)
One advantage of this rule is that it is simple and easy to
implement. Viewed from a computational perspective, it cor-
responds to an “exponential weighting” scheme, in which the
most recent observations are weighted most highly, where
the weight decays exponentially as a function of time.2 In
that sense, it is quite similar to the exponential generalization
gradients that are typically used in category learning models
(Nosofsky, 1984), but applied across time rather than psycho-
logical space. Additionally, this weighting function is similar
to the shape of the retention function in memory research.3
The key feature of this and similar rules is that the learner
is constantly adapting the prototype, never converging to a
single true value. Because of this, the model is quite sensitive
to the recent trends in the data. Learning rules of this form
capture human order effects in simple choice tasks (e.g., Yu
& Cohen, 2009; Go¨kaydin, Ma-Wyatt, Navarro, & Perfors,
2011). Moreover, such rules make sense as a near-optimal
inference scheme when there is a constant probability that
“something changes”, but the nature of the change is not pre-
dictable or systematic (e.g., Yu & Cohen, 2009; Brown &
Steyvers, 2009). In the next section, we illustrate how impor-
tant this sensitivity can be.
2The exact equation is µt = (1 − e−τ)∑ti=1 e−τ(t−i)xi + e−τt ,
where τ = − lnφ, and µ0 is the initial location of the prototype.
The derivation is included in the supplementary materials, but since
Equation 2 is the simpler and more interpretable version, we use it
throughout the paper rather than this more explicit exponential form.
3Although retention curves are generally have heavier tails than
exponentials (e.g. Rubin, Hinton, & Wenzel, 1999), this would
likely make little difference to a typical category learning experi-
ment.






















Figure 1: The experimental design from Navarro and Perfors (2009).
Stimuli varied along a single dimension (line length). Circles denote
items belonging to one category, and squares refer to the other cate-
gory. The two categories consist of the exact same set of 100 stimuli,
but are presented in a different order. The shading summarises the
human responses: the darker the shade, the more likely people were
to select the “circle” category (see Figure 2 for histograms showing
the probability of a correct response). Note the large “jump” around
trial 60, and the fact that humans quickly adapt to it.
Modelling adaptation to change
The typical view of “rationality” in a category learning ex-
periment assumes that the world is stationary. Under this
assumption, any sensitivity to the order in which items are
observed is irrational. However, this view is sometimes ex-
pressed even when using experimental designs that violate
the stationarity assumption. A good example of this is the pa-
per by Sakamoto et al. (2008), which presented results from a
simple supervised categorization task in which one category
possesed a strong time dependency. In this task, an order
sensitive model accounted for human classification decisions
better than an order insensitive one. Despite the fact that is
sensible to be sensitive to order such a situation, this was ar-
gued to be evidence against the rationality of human behavior
rather than evidence in favor of it.
To explore the extent to which people are sensitive to cat-
egories that change over time, Navarro and Perfors (2009)
conducted a categorization experiment in which the only in-
formation that distinguished the categories was the order in
which items were presented (the design is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1). Human performance was well above chance: partici-
pants correctly classified the stimuli on 76% of trials. How-
ever, models were not fitted to this data, making it somewhat
unclear exactly how badly an order insensitive model would
perform on the task, and the extent to which order sensitive
models would improve matters.
To address these question, here we fit4 six different models
to that data. Three of the models are not sensitive to order.
This includes two variations of a standard prototype model,
one assuming that both category distributions have equal vari-
ance (i.e., the same value of σ) and the other allowing unequal
variances, and a standard exemplar model (Nosofsky, 1984).
The other three models are analogous, but each use an expo-
nential weighting scheme to assign more importance to recent
4Throughout the paper we use the ordinary least-squares (OLS)
method to estimate model parameters: that is, we minimize the sum
squared deviation between model predictions and human classifica-
tions, though we exclude the first 10 trials since human and model
predictions are both quite variable initially.
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Figure 2: Graphical depiction of the performance of prototype (EV =
equal variance, UV = unequal variance) and exemplar models on the
classification task, for both the standard order-insensitive versions
(panel a) and the order-sensitive versions (panel b). The grey bars
plot human performance, and for reasons of visual clarity all plots
are averaged over 5 trial blocks. Notice the catastrophic prediction
failure for the order insensitive models during the second half of the
experiment.
items: this is equivalent to Equation 2 for the prototype mod-
els, and is slightly more complex for the exemplar model. The
formal details for all models are included in the supplemen-
tary materials. None of the models have more than two free
parameters in this task.
The important finding here, shown in Figure 2a, is that
none of the order insensitive models can mimic human be-
havior, nor can they achieve good classification performance
on the data. No order insensitive model can correctly clas-
sify the stimuli at a rate higher than 55%, regardless of what
parameter values are chosen. Moreover, none of the models
can account for more than 5% of the variance in human re-
sponses.5 The basic problem is evident in Figure 2a: when
the task changes at trial 60, no order insensitive model can
5We measure this using the Variance Accounted For (VAF)
statistic, which is equivalent to an R2 statistic in regression, but does
not estimate an intercept and slope: the model predictions are com-
pared directly to human performance.
adapt to it in the way humans do. Viewed as psychological
models, the inability to describe human behavior is a seri-
ous issue. In addition, the inability to achieve an acceptable
classification performance makes it clear that none of these
models provides a good rational standard for the task either.
In stark contrast, all three of the order sensitive models per-
form reasonably well, as shown in Figure 2b. When fit to the
human responses, the exemplar model and unequal-variance
prototype model are nearly indistinguishable, accounting for
79% and 80% of the variance respectively. The equal vari-
ance prototype model performs slightly worse, accounting for
72% of the variance. This is not surprising: as Figure 1 illus-
trates, the categories are not equally variable. In any case,
the important point is that all three order sensitive models are
massively superior to any of the order insensitive models.
This improvement in psychological performance is
matched by an improved classification rate. If the parame-
ters are chosen to maximize the classification accuracy rather
than to maximize the variance accounted for in human per-
formance, the exemplar model and unequal variance proto-
type models can both exceed human performance (89% and
82% accuracy), while the equal variance prototype model is
slightly worse (68% compared to the 76% of humans). While
it would be incorrect to suggest that any of these models pro-
vides an exact normative standard for this task, since the data
have a rather more complex structure than a simple exponen-
tial weighting mechanism suggests, it is clear from the supe-
rior classification performance that the order sensitive models
are much closer to the required standard than the usual order
insensitive models.
We have shown so far that order sensitivity is impor-
tant in understanding human category learning: standard or-
der insensitive models fail catastrophically when the world
changes, both as pure classifiers as well as models of human
classification. By contrast, models that use a simple expo-
nential weighting method do surprisingly well in capturing
human order sensitivity. But is that the entire explanation
for how humans respond to time dependence in the input?
One possibility is that it is, and that people change over time
because they have poor memories and are most likely to re-
call and use more recent information. The other possibility is
that when the changes are systematic, people actively notice
and adapt to them, allowing them to extrapolate in a sensible
way when making predictions about new items. In the rest of
this paper we describe experimental and computational work
showing that both possibilities appear to be true: human per-
formance is affected by memory limitations as well as the
ability to adapt in a sensible way.
Learning to predict changes
The central question going forward is whether people’s sensi-
tivity to change is the result of memory limitations or to a sen-
sible adaptation to a changing world. To some extent, these
explanations are not in conflict: memory is sensitive to the
need probability of the information to be recalled, and recent
information is more likely to be useful than older information
when the world changes (Anderson & Schooler, 1991). Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to make distinctions between the two.
For instance, when the world changes in systematic ways, it is
not usually an optimal strategy to just reweight old informa-
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Table 1: An overview of the five models used in the experiment. All
models are equal-variance prototype models, but differ in the man-
ner in which the category prototype is estimated. The first column
gives the label for the model, the second column indicates whether
the model used exponential weighting or not, and the third col-








tion. Instead, the right strategy is to learn to anticipate those
changes, and guess how the world is going to change before
the change actually happens. In this section we present a cat-
egory learning experiment in which people were presented
with fairly obvious and systematic temporal changes, and in-
vestigate how well people learned to anticipate those changes.
Method
Participants 59 participants were recruited through a mail-
ing list whose members consist primarily of current and for-
mer undergraduate psychology students, and paid $10/hour
for their time. The median age was 23, and the participants
were predominantly (63%) female.
Materials & Procedure The learning task was a stan-
dard supervised classification experiment, performed on a
computer. Stimuli were little cartoon objects (“floaters”),
which were displayed floating above a horizontal line (“the
ground”). The height of the floater was the only respect in
which the stimuli varied from each other.
On each of 100 trials participants were shown a single
floater and asked to predict whether it would flash red or
blue. After making their prediction, they would receive feed-
back for two seconds while the floater flashed the appropriate
color. As Figure 3 illustrates, as the experiment progressed,
all the stimuli shown to people tended to rise, regardless of
which category they belonged to. In the figure, circles corre-
spond to items that belong to the “high” category and crosses
correspond to times that belong to the “low” category. As-
signment of flash color (red or blue) to category (high or low)
was randomized across participants.
The classification rule was such that, if xt denotes the
height of the stimulus on trial t, then the optimal response is
to select the response option corresponding to the high cate-
gory if xt > t. Such a rule, shown as the solid line in Figure 3,
achieves 100% accuracy on the task. However, because most
stimuli tend to lie quite close to the classification boundary,
the task is relatively difficult even though the general trend is
clear. Consistent with this, participants during informal dis-
cussions indicated that they detected the upward trend early
in the experiment, but still found the task to be quite challeng-
ing.
Models We fit five models, outlined in Table 1, to the ex-
perimental data. For this task a prototype model provides a
good description of the category representation, and since the
two categories are in fact equal variance we can use the equal

















Figure 3: The experimental design. Circles denote stimuli belonging
to the “high” category and crosses denote stimuli belonging to the
“low” category. Although the classification rule changes over time
– that is, the classification boundary is constantly rising – it does so
in a regular fashion. The scale on the vertical axis is normalized so
that the average “rise” from one trial to the next is 1 unit; on screen,
this corresponded to an average rise of approximately 2mm per trial.
Note that although it is logically possible to correctly classify all
items, in practice the task is quite difficult, since most stimuli lie
close to the boundary.
variance prototype model as our basic model.6 The only dif-
ferences among the five models lies in how they calculate the
location of the prototype µt ; we systematically vary effects
of memory (i.e., how previous items are weighted) as well as
anticipation (i.e., what extrapolation method, if any, is used
to anticipate future items).
The first two models, STANDARD and RECENCY, do no ex-
trapolation at all: they are identical to the two equal-variance
prototype models from in the previous section. The STAN-
DARD model is the order-insensitive model with constant
weights as in Equation 1 whereas the recency model captures
order sensitivity via the exponential weighting scheme in
Equation 2. A third model, which we call RECENCY+BIAS,
incorporates this exponential weighting scheme, but also in-
corporates a component that captures participant adaptation
to the experimental design. It does so by shifting the proto-
type upwards by a constant amount β. In other words, this
model not only follows where the data are moving (using the
exponential weighting scheme), but it extrapolates to guess
where the data are moving to.7
The final two models explore the extent to which people
use a different and more optimal extrapolation method. These
models estimate an explicit linear regression model for each
category prototype, using the trial number as the predictor
(i.e., µt = at+b), re-estimating the regression equation after
each trial. This is not quite an ideal observer model for the
task, but it is extremely close: if we were to allow it to re-
spond deterministically (via the Luce (1963) choice rule, for
6We expect that the same pattern would be observed if we used
exemplar models or unequal variance prototype models; nothing in
the design is specific to the equal variance prototype model.
7Note that this is not quite identical to the usual manner in which
bias parameters are used in category learning models. The bias in
this case alters the underlying category representation (the proto-
type) rather than the response bias, although in this experimental















































Figure 4: Overall performance for humans and models. The qual-
itatively important characteristics are that humans perform above
chance on both categories, but perform better for the high category.
This qualitative pattern is captured only by the RECENCY + BIAS
model, which extrapolates about the future but also weights more
recent items more highly.
instance), it would be able to perfectly classify all items. The
fourth model, REGRESSION, uses exactly this linear regres-
sion model, while the fifth (RECENCY+REGRESSION) adds
an exponential weighting scheme in order to attach more im-
portance to recent observations when estimating the regres-
sion equation. In effect, this model assumes that the learner
applies a nonparametric regression model (in this case lowess
regression; Cleveland & Devlin, 1988) to estimate the loca-
tion of the prototype, rather than a linear regression model.
The formal specification for all models can be found in the
supplementary materials. For now it is sufficient to note that
the only free parameters in the models are the φ parameter
that governs the amount of weighting for the three models that
use exponential weighting (Equation 2) and an additional bias
parameter β for the RECENCY+BIAS model.8 The category
variances are not free parameters, as these are estimated by
the models, though somewhat differently in each case.9
Results
Human performance was significantly above chance for both
categories: 76% of the “high” category items and 61% of
the “low” category items were classified correctly. Using
8Because it turns out that the model with the best performance
is also the one with the most parameters, we checked that model
complexity was not the source of its superior performance. This
was done by calculating the Bayes factors for all models, using a
uniform prior over φ (which varies between 0 and 1) for the three
models that use exponential weighting and a uniform prior over β
across the range of 0 to 10. The RECENCY+BIAS model was easily
the preferred model: a numerically estimated Bayes factor produced
an odds ratio of about 107 to 1 favoring it over the next best model.
9Note that including this as a free parameter would make no qual-
itative difference to the model predictions: all of the characteristics
of the data that we focus on depend only on the classification bound-
ary of the model, which does not depend on the variance at all.





























Figure 5: Individual participant data. Each dot represents one par-
ticipant: the horizontal co-ordinate shows their classification perfor-
mance on items that belonged to the lower category, and the verti-
cal co-ordinate plots the performance on the higher category. The
other markers show the model predictions, as indicated in the leg-
end. The dotted triangular region corresponds to all possible pat-
terns in which classification performance is above chance for both
categories, but with the high category showing better performance.
The majority of human participants fall within the triangle, as does
the RECENCY+BIAS model.
each participant as a distinct data point, a single sample t-test
against chance performace of 50% correct produced signifi-
cant results for both the high category (t58 = 19.6, p < .001)
and the low one (t58 = 7.3, p< .001). The difference between
the two categories was also significant: a paired samples t-
test showed that people perform significantly better on the
high category than the low one (t58 = 8.5, p < .001). This is
illustrated in Figure 4, which also shows the performance of
all five models. Only the RECENCY+BIAS model reproduces
the human pattern. Of the other four, two of them perform be-
low chance for the low category, and the other two are unable
to correctly capture the asymmetry between the categories.
This effect is even more obvious when we plot the data
from the individual subjects. Figure 5 shows the classification
performance for each of the participants for both the low cat-
egory (horizontal axis) and the high category (vertical axis).
Most human participants fall within the triangular region, in
which the high category is classified better but performance is
above chance for both categories. Only the RECENCY+BIAS
model falls into the same region.
In addition to looking at the data at an individual sub-
jects level, it is useful to examine model performance at
an individual stimulus level. That is, how well does each
model capture the trial-by-trial changes in performance? The
RECENCY+BIAS model captures 39% of the variance at the
item level, compared to the 13% of the variance for the
RECENCY+REGRESSION model. No other model can explain
any of the variability in the human data at the item level.
Finally, since the quantitative evidence for the
RECENCY+BIAS model is so strong, it is important to
see if the the parameter estimates are sensible. The estimated
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recency parameter was φ = 0.25, meaning that participants
weighted each new observation xt about one-quarter as
strongly as the old prototype µt−1 when updating the pro-
totype. The bias parameter of β = 4.41 appears to be a
substantial upward shift, but as Figure 4 illustrates, it is
not quite large enough to overcome the “lag” induced by a
reliance on old observations (as per the simpler RECENCY
model). In other words, this model still lags a little behind
the data.
Discussion
The experiments and computational modelling in this paper
provide evidence that people adapt to changing categories in
the world. This adaptation occurs not only because people
weight more recent items more highly, but also because they
form anticipations about the nature of the change. This work
is somewhat preliminary, however, insofar as there are a num-
ber of extensions that are important to pursue. Most notable
among these are the need to consider other patterns of change
besides simple linear trends, and the need to extend the
modelling framework to incorporate “relative judgment” ap-
proaches to categorization (Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2002)
which encode stimuli in terms of their relationship to recent
items. We are currently pursuing both of these avenues.
Nevertheless, the results are interesting even without these
extensions. The fact that world changes with time, and
our conceptual representations must change with it, carries
a number of important corollaries. In situations where the
world is not constant over time, then models of category
learning that assume a stationary environment are not sen-
sible choices as rational standards for behavior. Indeed, such
models do not turn out to be good models for human behav-
ior. This does not invalidate them as good models in the con-
texts for which they were originally developed, but it sharply
limits the generalizations one should draw from them. It is
incorrect to conclude that a “rational” model that relies on an
assumption of stationarity will apply to a world that changes
over time and still remain a rational model in that context.
Humans adapt to change, and as illustrated in the second part
of the paper, if the structure of the temporal change is regu-
lar enough, we can and do learn to anticipate those changes
before they occur.
That said, the best model for human performance in the
task is not the ideal observer model (REGRESSION). It is in-
stead the one that takes the simple prototype model with re-
cency weighting (Equation 2) and makes the smallest change
required to be suitable to the task. The performance of this
model suggests that the adaptations that people make to an-
ticipate systemic changes are conservative: they make smaller
adjustments than the data warrant, strictly speaking (Phillips
& Edwards, 1966). Conservatism itself may be a sensible
adaptation (Navon, 1978), but this is not in our view the ma-
jor point. The key goal is to learn what kinds of changes
people are able to detect and anticipate, and how that helps us
adapt to a changeable world.
Viewed from this perspective, it is notable that we were
led to these results by considering the underlying inference
problem that the learner has to solve: category learning
in a dynamic world. In that sense, our approach offers
a computational analysis, and the models that had an ex-
trapolative component (RECENCY+BIAS, REGRESSION, and
RECENCY+REGRESSION) are all inspired by that observa-
tion. However, our approach also has much in common with
process-level analyses that take seriously the possibility that
people must operate within the constraints imposed by mem-
ory limitations. Our work helps to bridge the two levels,
bringing us closer to a united explanation of how people learn
categories within a changing world.
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